The Impact of Cyber Capabilities on Naval Logistics and Operations

I. Introduction

The United States Navy, one of the strong pillars of security overseas, counts on support from complex hardware, software, and terrestrial facilities. However, such reliance opens up vital weaknesses to cyber threats, with threats emanating more from China. China’s cyberspace tactics are aimed at disrupting the American Navy’s supply chain regarding fuel refining, defense industries, shipbuilding and servicing, and naval software. These actions are part of China’s overall approach to undermining American hegemony in maritime and logistics and weakening the U.S. military’s operational capability. Protecting naval supply chains and operations is crucial with the growing interlinkage between the maritime and the cyber regions. This paper posits that improving cyber resilience is paramount to sustaining the United States’ naval power and dissuading all actors, especially China, of the 21st-century threats.

II. Overview of Mahan and Corbett’s Naval Strategy

Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett’s foundational theories about modern naval strategy continue to illuminate its qualities and incorporation into cyber capabilities. Mahan’s seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, emphasizes the importance of controlling strategic sea lanes and choke points for national power and economic prosperity (p. 103).[1] Mahan’s focus on “sea lines of communication” can be translated into the cyber domain, where protecting data flows and logistics networks is akin to defending traditional maritime routes (par. 2).[2] For example, safeguarding naval logistics systems from cyberattacks is as essential as Mahan’s call for sea control, which is to have the ability to resupply fleets and operate readily.

However, instead of emphasizing integration, Corbett regarded naval power as complementary to land-based operations for accomplishing strategic goals in a multivariate fashion. McCranie (2021) notes that his Some Principles of Maritime Strategy also outlines relative control of the seas in place of total dominance, the cooperation between land and naval forces. It maps to current cyber strategies, in which adversaries such as China may simultaneously attack U.S. naval and ground logistics systems in cyberspace to degrade U.S. readiness. For instance, malware targeting naval fuel depots or stock supplies exemplifies Corbett’s concept of leveraging multiple domains for advantage (par. 5).[3]

In modern applications, cyberspace functions as the “ocean” of today—essential for military and economic activity. Just as blockades in traditional naval warfare can paralyze naval operations, disruption of cyber communication lines can render naval operations powerless (par.3).[4] Mahan’s and Corbett’s principles brought to the forefront the reality that digital and physical infrastructure must be protected to maintain maritime dominance in the age of cyber resilience.

III. Current Threat Landscape Against the U.S. Navy

Since state actors, notably China, leverage advanced cyber capabilities to compete with U.S. maritime dominance, the threat landscape in which the U.S. Navy must operate has evolved with increasing sophistication. Today, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) cyber tools are integrated within its more comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy against U.S. naval logistics, communications, and operational readiness. This strategy takes advantage of Navy vulnerabilities in using interdependent systems, such as land-based logistical facilities, digital networks, and operations technologies, to impose delays and reduce capabilities (par. 5).[5]

China’s cyber doctrine emphasizes preemptive strikes to weaken adversaries’ operational tempo. For instance, malware or ransomware may infect navy supply chain networks, stop fuel supply, hinder ammunition-loading cranes’ functioning, or delay depot maintenance timelines. These actions could slow fleet readiness, especially in sensitive areas like the Asia-Pacific, which is the domain PLAN wants to control (p. 1).[6] Also, China undertook cyber espionage activities to obtain intellectual property from several defense contractors in the United States, modernize the Chinese military, and learn about the system’s weaknesses (p. 440).[7]

These cyber capabilities are intended to counter the Navy’s tactical benefits, making the United States spend more time and part more money to keep capable and ready. More recent joint operations with navies opening new domains with cyberspace means that every aspect of the Naval logistics and infrastructure must be protected and strengthened to counter the growing Chinese maritime power.

IV. China’s Cyber Capabilities

Regarding cyber challenges, China has been rated as the most dangerous threat to the U.S. Navy and logistics as it enhances the employment of cyber warfare and tactics in line with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy. China has created second-generation cyber warfare tools that target a system’s weaknesses, disrupt its response time, and chip away at its strategic position. All these capabilities are enshrined in the military End-State concept and the profound articulation of Civil-Military relations.

Development of Cyber Capabilities and Strategy

China’s emphasis on becoming a “cyber superpower” is central to its national strategy. The doctrine of “cyber sovereignty,” which grants the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over its domestic cyberspace and technologies, underpins its approach (p.102).[8] With this control, the Chinese government also gets to force compromises by depending on various flaws in both civilian and military technologies. Requirements for China’s cyber advancement are based on Pentagon requirements or are made by the Chinese government. Six of these are critical enablers, including military-civil fusion, such as universities, information technology firms, and private contractors.[9] This policy ensures a constant replenishment of research, hardware, and software experience for China, which has significantly advanced the tools that suit espionage, disruption, and sabotage.

Specific Risks to U.S. Naval Operations

As evident earlier, China can take advantage of such cyber incidences, posing threats to the logistics of the United States Navy. Sneak intelligence is a traditional method in Chinese operations, mainly targeting various countries to get information on state-of-the-art technologies in the defense sector (par. 14).[10] For example, China has been involved in the massive hacking of American military contractors and chipmakers to steal information such as designs on new-generation warfare platforms and naval vessels (p. 4).[11] It also supports China’s military modernization process and enables the PLA to discover vulnerabilities in American systems.

Besides, the identified Chinese sources gained experience and skills in implanting malware into computer networks, adding potential risks to the project. The adversaries can compromise naval operations at the right time through malware insertion into hardware or software components, most of which are made in China (p. 1441).[12] Malware could disrupt inventory systems, fuel delivery, and ship-loading cranes, delaying fleet readiness during emergencies and critical operations.

Assessment of Impact on U.S. Naval Capabilities

China’s cyberspace power seeks to disrupt the U.S. naval units’ logistical, communication, and replenishment nodes to slow its operational velocity and readiness. This strategy is essential in the contested areas, such as the Indo-Pacific and the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy), which could capitalize on the potential delays and gain dominance. Cyber-activities prepare for kinetic actions that adversely affect the United States forces and prepare the context for China’s campaign (par. 8).[13] For instance, coordinated information warfare attacks on American naval targets and infrastructure could slow down mobilizations and thus foster heightened exposure to surprise in key sectors such as the Taiwan Strait area.[14] This aligns with China’s operationalization of cyberspace as one of the main combat multipliers in what is believed to be asymmetrical warfare intended to target acute dependency points to turn off U.S. naval operations. To this end, the U.S. Navy needs to enhance the network’s defenses, protect the supply chains, and accept the future employment of cyber operations as an inherent part of naval warfare.

V. U.S. Navy Cyber Strategy

The new U.S. Navy has refreshed its cyber strategy by underlining the necessity of incorporating cyber weapon systems and specialists into the warfare framework in different domains to remain unbeaten. Since cyber was officially acknowledged as a warfighting domain alongside air, land, and sea in 2020, the Navy’s strategy focuses on enhancing the resilience and effectiveness of its operations to address emerging threats from rising Eastern powers, such as China (par. 8).[15] This approach represents a cultural change in the Navy, where cybersecurity, or its lack, is no longer seen as a defense measure but as an essential part of offense and strategies.

To reduce network and operational technology attacks, the Navy has adopted the zero-trust approach and applied artificial intelligence in threat detection. Zero trust maintains that no one is trustworthy and examines digital permissions. This framework reduces insider risks, account abuse, and interrelated system concerns. Program-AI skills are also increasing for real-time cyber threat monitoring and assault response with greater agility than competitors.

Nevertheless, the current paper identifies various barriers to efficiently executing the Navy’s cyber strategy. The slow and cumbersome access acquisition system inherited from the Department of Defense (DoD) slows the pace at which the Navy can adapt to the ever-changing cyber threats (p. 10).[16] Their dependence on outdated systems and software puts them in danger of hostile attacks, while early adoption of new systems undermines infrastructure. Although the Navy has cut its reliance on Chinese-made components by 40% in strategic supply lines, the armed forces have yet to be able to cut all ties with China in microelectronics and software assembly (par. 16).[17]

To mitigate these risks, the Navy needs to advance its cyber plan by improving the backup of logistical and operational networks. This is proven by creating manual backups and developing multiple layers of protection in vital naval facilities and structures to maintain functionality during cyber incidents. Further, the Navy should increase its service-retained cyber forces, separate from U.S. Cyber Command, to counter maritime threats and support the Navy quickly and efficiently (p. 1435).[18] These will be essential steps to ensure the Navy can continue to project force, maintain readiness, and support its logistical needs in cyberspace when these domains are contested.

VI. China’s Cyber War Doctrine/Strategy Against the U.S. Navy

China has established a cyber-war theory to reduce U.S. maritime dominance by incorporating cyber warfare into its military pay. This strategy emphasizes “Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare,” which integrates cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare to exploit adversary weaknesses. It aims to reduce the U.S. Navy’s operating capacity, delay deployment, and prevent entry into important theaters like the Indo-Pacific.

Offensive Cyber Operations

China classifies its cyber-attack strategy as an offense by preparation and focuses on executing pre-emptive attacks on U.S. naval forces’ auxiliaries, operations communication, and operational technology (OT) systems. Malware is intrinsic to this strategy to a further extent, allowing the adversary to penetrate and turn off critical assets. For example, Chinese operatives could attack us ports and paralyze operations by freezing inventory controls, getting rid of fuel systems, or influencing crane operations to load munitions onto replenishment ships (par. 3).[19] By exploiting these crucial links in the Navy’s supply chain, China could deny the Navy’s crucial supplies when they are most needed, thus providing itself with a significant operational edge during a crisis.

China’s assault strategy targets the Navy’s supply chain, including Chinese infrastructure and digital equipment. The malware in these systems could activate when the two nations clash in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. These disruptions could disarm the U.S. naval vessels or slow down their operations, thus decreasing their capability to project power or check the expanding prowess of the Chinese.

Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare

An important aspect of China’s cyberspace war is the organization of cyberspace, electronic, and psychological activity under a single command. This concept of Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare involves imposing and coordinating attacks in all domains to overwhelm an adversary’s defenses. In cyberspace, sea communication may be degraded, while electronic warfare interferes with coordinating naval fleets’ satellite and radar systems.[20] Psychological warfare complements these disruptions by increased pressure on U.S. personnel, information warfare for sowing confusion, and a gradual degradation of public trust in the Navy.

Strategic Implications for Naval Power

China aims to weaken U.S. naval superiority in the Asia-Pacific through cyber-attacks on logistics and operational support systems. Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. naval supply networks, port facilities, and command-and-control systems aim to delay crisis responses. Cyber disruptions might hurt amphibious and carrier strike group operations in a Taiwan confrontation, allowing the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to solidify regional dominance (par. 6).[21] Cyber capabilities are force multipliers in China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, degrading U.S. preparedness and operational efficiency while boosting Chinese naval influence in crucial locations.

Cyber warfare, as a part of China’s overall strategic approach, keeps it from outright confrontation with the United States while subverting American naval domination. Similarly, to other cyber operations, the hybrid threats described here target specifically the United States’ critical supply and logistical chains to inflict delays and strategic costs upon the U.S. Navy. Using this approach, Beijing creates pressure and harasses the American military, leading to the retreat and building up on the power that China seeks to control regions such as the first and second island chains (pp. 440-443).[22] However, the United States Navy must advance digital transformation, improve cybersecurity, diversify the supply chain, and use cyber in offense to respond to these threats. These measures are key to sustaining robustness, deterring command of the seas, and sustaining tactical advantages against China’s expanding coordinated and systematic employment of cyber warfare.

VII. Modern Navies’ Reliance on Technology

Modern navies and military organizations rely heavily on advanced technology, particularly the U.S. Navy, due to its reliance on tactical superiority, logistical support, and operational range. However, newly created dependencies on interconnected systems have erected significant vulnerabilities to cyber threats. Complex weapon platforms, communication systems, and logistics networks put the systems that naval operations rely on at risk of cyberattacks.[23] For instance, cyberattacks can target missile defense systems, radar platforms, and GPS networks, making it difficult for the Navy to continue its operations effectively.

Moreover, logistics, an often overlooked aspect of naval readiness, demonstrates significant reliance. Hackers could cause disruptions by invading shipyards and ports, damaging fuel inventory systems, or interrupting future scheduled maintenance. A cyberattack could freeze supply chains or remove crucial networked gear, such as ammunition hoist cranes, slowing the Navy’s ability to deploy in crises. These threats show how vulnerable the overall process is when digital networks are used without the proper preventive measures.

China’s cyber strategy has taken advantage of such openings, accommodating malware in supply systems and copying hardware and software used by the U.S. Navy (p. 4).[24] The ramifications of such intrusions could range from simple disruption of operations to severe compromise of the operation’s readiness in the long run. According to Doherty (n.d.), the disruption could be as simple as a breakdown in communication or logistics, rendering a technologically sophisticated navy completely ineffective in contested circumstances.[25] Therefore, it is crucial for the naval power to protect its technological dependencies and maintain its position as the dominant force.

VIII. The Role of Cyber in U.S. Naval Strategy

Enabling Naval Dominance

Cyber power is crucial to modern U.S. naval forces. The modern Navy’s cyberspace control and operation protect communication, maneuverability, logistical support, and other assistance. Formerly, possession of important shipping routes and strategic passages defined maritime superiority; currently, it applies to cyberspace, which serves as the main framework for managing weapon systems, supplies, and worldwide communication networks (p. 10).[26] More IT security is needed to secure onboard systems and directives, making it easier for the Navy to conduct well-orchestrated maneuvers or counter enemy attacks. Cyber capabilities enable information collection and situational awareness, giving the Navy real-time battlespace knowledge of enemies’ actions and intentions.

Countering Chinese Naval Expansion

With the help of cyber capabilities in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), the rising China’s naval force requires a robust cyber presence for the United States. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has sought to develop cyber tools to weaken American sea power by intercepting supply chains and weakening tactical communication networks (p. 105).[27] The U.S. Navy must safeguard its networks and prevent Chinese communication and control systems via cyber. Cyber capabilities can hinder South and East China Sea information interchange and naval operations, reducing China’s numerical and regional might. Attack-related cyber capabilities may turn off the PLAN’s satellite connection, preventing it from tracking U.S. carrier strike groups or coordinating A2/AD assets like anti-ship missiles.

Integration of Cyber and Maritime Strategy

As a key topic, cyber must be fully integrated into maritime strategy along with carriers, submarines, and destroyers. It raises the novelty of thinking through naval operations in contested domains and the near certainty of occasional kinetic conflicts. For example, in a Taiwan conflict, cyber operations could slow Chinese deployments, disrupt logistics, or induce confusion, giving U.S. forces a strategic advantage. Furthermore, techniques for securing naval logistics using redundant systems and countermeasures against cyberattacks are essential to ensure resilience and to maintain its worldwide superiority in a changing threat environment.

IX. Conclusion

By exploiting vulnerabilities within the logistical supply chains, critical infrastructure, and advanced technologies, China’s nascent cyber capabilities threaten U.S. naval dominance directly and multifaceted across all of its operations. Navy cyber-enabled disruption erodes readiness, delays deployments, and impairs the Navy’s ability to project power globally as cyber-enabled disruptions degrade routine activities. Therefore, the U.S. Navy must adopt an active and holistic cyber resilience posture in its systems and develop the capability to defend against and conduct cyber operations. It includes securing land-based logistics, developing specialized naval cyber forces, and fully incorporating cyber warfare into its planning and doctrine. In an environment where the global maritime domain is becoming increasingly contested, controlling and operating in cyberspace will define the Navy’s ability to deter adversaries and maintain influence and freedom of navigation in a rapidly changing geopolitical domain. Cyber is no longer an extra dimension of maritime strategy; it is the axis around which it operates.